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ABSTRACT 
Over  the  last  decade,  the  nature  of  cybercrime  has 
transformed from naive vandalism to profit-driven, leading 
to  the  emergence  of  a  global  underground  economy.  A 
noticeable trend which has surfaced in this economy is the 
repeated  use  of  forums  to  operate  online  stolen  data 
markets.  Using  interaction  data  from  three  prominent 
carding  forums:  Shadowcrew,  Cardersmarket  and 
Darkmarket, this study sets out to understand why forums 
are repeatedly chosen to operate online stolen data markets 
despite  numerous  successful  infiltrations  by  law 
enforcement  in  the  past.  Drawing  on  theories  from 
criminology,  social  psychology,  economics  and  network 
science, this study has identified four fundamental socio-
economic  mechanisms  offered  by  carding  forums:  (1) 
formal control and coordination; (2) social networking; (3) 
identity  uncertainty  mitigation;  (4)  quality  uncertainty 
mitigation.  Together,  they  give  rise  to  a  sophisticated 
underground  market  regulatory  system  that  facilitates 
underground trading over the Internet and thus drives the 
expansion of the underground economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite over a decade of extensive research into computer 
and cyber security, cybercrime remains one of the primary 
threats  facing  governments,  corporations  and  ordinary 
citizens [31]. This raises an intriguing question: how has 
cybercrime managed to evolve into the persistent problem 
we are facing today?  
One of the main reasons is the emergence of a profit-driven 
underground economy [10, 18, 31] in which cybercriminals 
with  a  variety  of  different  skills  and  resources  trade 
competitively according to the laws of market supply and 
demand.  One  major  source  of  profit  driving  this 
underground economy is  carding: a type  of identity theft 
which involves the unauthorised use of credit and debit card 
account  information  to  fraudulently  purchase  goods  and 
services [21]. The scope of the term has evolved over the 
past  few  years  to  incorporate  a  broader  range  of  related 
activities including hacking, phishing and auction frauds.  
 
Figure 1: The Underground Economy. 
Labour  specialisation  has  emerged  in  this  sophisticated 
“underground  economy”  (see  fig.  1)  with  key  roles 
including carders, hackers, malware authors, phishers and 
spammers. As Moore et al note [18]: 
Just as in Adam Smith’s pin factory, specialization has 
led to impressive productivity gains, even though the 
subject is now bank card PINs rather than metal ones.  
However,  there  also  exists  dishonest  traders  among 
cybercriminals, known as the “rippers”. These rippers take 
advantage  of  the  anonymity  of  the  Internet  and  trade 
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Copyright 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-1889-1....$10.00. dishonestly,  stealing  money  from  cybercriminals.  In 
essence, they erode the trust in the underground economy 
and thus increasing the uncertainty among cybercriminals. 
To  avoid  this  ripper  “tax”,  many  carders  have  formed 
closed  knit  carding  groups  in  the  form  of  closed 
membership carding forums [10]. A snapshot of one of the 
earliest carding forums called Shadowcrew is shown in fig. 
2. Members of Shadowcrew are believed to have trafficked 
at least 1.7 million credit cards and inflicted more than 4 
million dollars worth of damage [5]. Many carding forums 
have  since  appeared  including  Carderplanet  [8], 
Cardersmarket [22], Darkmarket [8] and Ghostmarket [15]. 
 
Figure 2: Interface of Shadowcrew. 
A  crucial  question  which  has  thus  far  received  little 
attention  from  security  researchers  is  why  are  forums 
repeatedly  chosen  to  operate  online  stolen  data  markets 
despite  numerous  successful  infiltrations  by  law 
enforcement? This is the question addressed in this study. 
In collaboration with the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA),  this  project  has  been  granted  access  to  the 
anonymised interaction data from two high profile carding 
forums  which  were  recently  taken  down  [8,  22] 
Cardersmarket (CM) and Darkmarket (DM). Furthermore, 
we have access to the qualitative archive of a snapshot of 
Shadowcrew (SC) which provides us with a unique set of 
qualitative data to supplement our statistical analysis.  
Drawing on theories from criminology, social psychology, 
economics and network science as well as using a unique 
set of quantitative and qualitative data available, the aim of 
this  study  is  to  investigate  the  reasons  for  forums  to  be 
repeatedly  chosen  by  cybercriminals  to  operate  online 
stolen data markets. From our analysis, we find that there 
are four crucial socio-economic mechanisms offered by the 
forums  and  which  together  greatly  facilitate  online 
underground trading: 
  Formal control and coordination 
  Social networking 
  Identity uncertainty mitigation  
  Quality uncertainty mitigation  
The  implications  of  this  study  is  to  help  security 
practitioners  better  understand  the  socio-economic 
requirements  of  online  underground  trading  among 
cybercriminals so that they can better estimate the size of 
the underground economy, its scalability and scanning the 
horizon  for new  web  applications  which  may  be  used  to 
facilitate online underground trading.  
MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK 
One  of  the  first  to  publish  on  the  functioning  of  the 
underground  economy  are  Thomas  and  Martin  [25]  who 
revealed the process of illicit trading of stolen credit card 
data  over  the  Internet  Relay  Chat  (IRC).  Franklin  et  al 
performed  a  detailed  statistical  analysis  of  the  carding 
merchandise traded on the IRC [6].  
There are also three recent studies on underground forums. 
Holt and Lampke [12] manually analysed six forums and 
found  that  the  dynamics  of  the  stolen  data  markets  are 
governed  by  four  key  factors:  communications,  price, 
quality and service. Lusthaus [15] analysed the structure of 
online criminal groups through the use of interviews with 
hackers and data from a carding forum named Ghostmarket. 
Lastly,  Motoyama  et  al  [19]  analysed  six  underground 
forums with one German carding forum called carders.cc. 
However, like previous studies on carding activities on the 
IRC,  this  study  focuses  on  the  statistical  analysis  of  the 
forum.  
The study presented in this paper differs from the above by 
investigating  the  socio-economic  requirements  of  online 
underground trading and how they are facilitated by carding 
forums.  
DATASET: CARDING FORUMS 
Shadowcrew was founded in 2002 by Andrew Mantovani, a 
20 year-old part time business student in Arizona. He was 
already a member of a hacking group at the time but one 
which only stored stolen data [9]. He realised that there was 
a  need  for  a  place  to  trade  stolen  data  online  and  after 
meeting  David  Appleyard,  a  mortgage  broker  in  his 40s, 
they  founded  one  of  the  earliest  carding  forums: 
Shadowcrew. When it was finally shut down in 2004 as part 
of Operation Firewall [5, 8, 22], Shadowcrew members had 
already  trafficked  more  than  1.7  million  credit  card 
numbers  and  inflicted  over  4  million  dollars  worth  of 
damage.  The  same  operation  also  led  to  the  demise  of 
another  significant  but  Russian  speaking  carding  forum 
called Carderplanet which began operation in 2001[8, 22]. 
In  order to  fill  the  void  left  behind  by  Carderplanet and 
Shadowcrew,  two  carding  forums  emerged  in  2005: 
Cardersmarket and Darkmarket [8, 22]. Both forums were 
engaged in a bitter board war over the course of their co-
existence  until  being  taken  down  in  2007  and  2008 
respectively, [8, 22]. This highlights the value of carding 
forums in the underground economy and thus warrants an 
investigation  into  why  forums  are  repeatedly  chosen  to 
operate online stolen data markets. Much like conventional online discussion forums, carding 
forums  are  used  mainly  for  trading  carding  goods  and 
services. A carding forum is typically divided into a series 
of sub-forums each dedicated to a particular type of content 
such  as  trading,  tutorials,  discussions  and  a  blacklist  of 
dishonest traders (the “rippers”). Users can start topics, also 
known as threads, which others can reply to by  creating 
posts.  Members  can  also  communicate  via  private 
messaging (PM) which is often used by carders to carry out 
more  detailed negotiations.  Members are  free  to  network 
with  one  another  to  engage  in  discussions  and  trading. 
Potential trading partners could either contact each other via 
private messaging on the forums or other means of contact 
such as email or ICQ. In this study, we have access to the 
anonymised interaction data from Cardersmarket (CM) and 
Darkmarket  (DM),  as  well  as  a  qualitative  archive  of  a 
snapshot of Shadowcrew (SC). The CM and DM datasets 
are summarised in table 1. 
The following section presents an empirical analysis into 
the facilitating mechanisms offered by carding forums. 
ANALYSIS 
Previous  studies  have  observed  underground  trading 
activities on both the IRC [6, 25] and forums [12, 15, 19]. 
However,  using  the  "market  for  lemons"  theory  from 
economics,  Herley  and  Florêncio  [10]  argue  that  the 
prevalence  of  dishonest  traders  (a.k.a.  "rippers")  in  the 
underground economy means there is too much uncertainty 
for a competitive market to emerge on open platforms like 
the IRC. Rather, the majority  of serious trading occur in 
closed gangs such as carding forums. This study builds on 
this claim by proposing four socio-economic mechanisms 
offered by carding forums which together greatly facilitate 
underground trading over an anonymised environment such 
as the Internet and thus explain why forums are repeatedly 
chosen  by  cybercriminals  to  operate  online  stolen  data 
markets.  
  Formal  control  and  coordination:  according  to 
Transaction  Cost  Economics  (TCE),  a  hierarchical 
structure  has  lower  coordination  costs  than  a  pure 
market  structure  and  thus  more  suitable  for 
organisations with high coordination requirements [23, 
29].  Since  by  its  nature  the  underground  economy 
involves  dishonest  individuals,  coordination  activities 
such as membership administration is paramount to the 
emergence  of  a  competitive  stolen  data  market.  We 
hypothesise that the inherent hierarchical management 
structure  and  network  boundary  offered  by  forums 
greatly  assists  cybercriminals  in  implementing  a  well 
coordinated  management  system  for  monitoring  and 
regulating behaviour in the underground market.  
  Social  networking:  trading  is  a  social  activity  as  it 
requires one to interact with others. Therefore, essential 
to  the  success  of  a  cybercriminal  is  to  network  with 
fellow  cybercriminals  in  order  to  find  the appropriate 
supplies and demands as well as opportunities. Akin to 
the legitimate world, social capital [2] is significant to 
the success of a cybercriminal. In the criminal world, 
this  translates  to  criminal  capital  [16]  which  includes 
access to skills, resources and information for criminal 
purposes. We therefore hypothesise that carding forums 
are  repeatedly  chosen  as  they  facilitate  social 
networking among cybercriminals. 
  Identity uncertainty mitigation: due to the anonymity 
offered  by  the  Internet,  it  is  difficult  for  the 
cybercriminals to determine whether a potential trading 
partner is a serious cybercriminal, a potential ripper or a 
law enforcement associate. It is important to note that it 
was  the  latter  which  helped  bring  down  Shadowcrew  
[5,  8].  As  outlined  in  [4,  7,  26],  the  knowledge  of  a 
person’s past is vital to the emergence of trust. Due to 
the  asynchronous  nature  of  forum  contents,  carding 
forums  allow  cybercriminals  to  monitor  the  past 
behaviour of one another. Unless explicitly removed by 
those in charge, forum contents such as threads, posts 
and private messages are archived over time. Therefore, 
if  one  needs  to  decide  whether  a  potential  trader  is 
trustworthy,  they  could  perform  a  search  for  the 
person’s past record of interactions with the community 
to see if there has been any unusual behaviour which 
may appear deviant from the community's norms [11, 
28].  Therefore,  we  hypothesise  that  carding  forums 
allow cybercriminals to mitigate identity uncertainty by 
facilitating  the  development  of  in-group  identity  and 
prototypical  behaviour  through  repeated  symbolic 
interactions with one another [24, 30].  
  Quality uncertainty mitigation: as already mentioned, 
one of the major obstacles for cybercriminals to trade 
over  the  Internet  is  the  prevalence  of  rippers.  As 
described  by  Herley  and  Florêncio  [10], these  rippers 
trade  dishonestly  using  a  variety  of  methods  such  as 
double selling the same set of stolen credit card data to 
multiple  buyers.  Therefore,  for  the  serious 
cybercriminals, there is a great amount of uncertainty 
about the quality of goods and services offered by the 
vendors  with  whom  they  may  not  have  prior  trading 
Forum  Operational Period  Users  Threads  Posts  PMs 
CM  2005 - 2007  2759  7476  31391  24836 
DM  2005 - 2008  2075  6240  32089  15370 
Table 1: Summary statistics of Cardersmarket (CM) and Darkmarket (DM). experience.  We  hypothesise  that  forums  mitigate  this 
uncertainty by offering a comprehensive review process 
for  prospective  vendors  which  is  enforced  by  the 
hierarchical management structure. 
Together, the above four socio-economic mechanisms give 
rise  to  a  sophisticated  underground  market  regulatory 
system  as  shown  in  fig.  3.  The  following  present  the 
empirical evidence which verifies our hypothesis outlined 
above.  
Formal control and coordination 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of forums is the 
inherent hierarchical management system, which is shown 
in fig. 4. Below is a brief description of the common ranks 
assigned  to  registered  users  on  carding  forums.  It  is 
particularly important to understand the roles  as they are 
vital to the socio-economic mechanisms shown in fig. 3. 
Administrators:  they  are  responsible  for  the  overall 
management of the forum and making long term strategic 
decisions.  Such  strategic  decisions  include  protecting  the 
forum from attacks by other similar carding forums, should 
they  become  involved  in  a  “board  war”  [8,  22]. 
Administrators are also responsible for managing the forum 
members  including  rewards  and  punishments  when 
appropriate.  In  particular,  they  safeguard  the  forum  by 
removing  the  “rippers”,  the  members  who  have  cheated 
money off others. 
Moderators:  the  moderators  are  responsible  for  the 
management of the sub-forums which either fall into their 
expertise or geographical location. They specify the rules 
for posts as well as removing inappropriate ones.  
Reviewers:  their duty is to test illicit goods and services 
from the members wishing to become a vendor. This is the 
key  part  of  the  trust  mechanism  in  place  as  these  few 
reviewers are endorsed by the majority as trustworthy and 
the trust on them propagates to the vendors they review, 
allowing quality assurance to take place and propagate as 
supply increases.  
Reviewed  vendors:  they  are  those  who  have  been 
referenced by the reviewers and are deemed as trustworthy. 
As reputation is crucial to their success and since the only 
way the system could recognize these reviewed vendors is 
through  their  chosen  username,  the  usernames  become 
attached  to  their  reputation.  Thus,  most  members  rarely 
change their usernames within a forum [15]. 
Members: normal members who are not reviewed vendors 
may also sell goods on carding forums but they most often 
sell at lower prices due to the lack of reputation. Those who 
buy  from them bare the risk at their own discretion. The 
services offered by the members are generally similar to the 
ones listed by Thomas and Martin [25] and Franklin et al 
[6]. Many carders are members of multiple forums [8, 22].  
Having understood the roles of each rank, it is appropriate 
to  examine  how  this  hierarchical  management  structure 
enables  formal  control  over  the  forum  members.  This  is 
best  demonstrated  using  a  combination  of  qualitative 
quantitative data. Below is a complaint against a potential 
ripper posted on a carding forum: 
Earlier today Hacker666 made a post looking for pin 
cashers.  Like  many  members  I  jumped  on  this  and 
messaged him. He will try to get you to send money to 
his E-gold account before cashing. This is to make sure 
you are not a ripper. So I get suckered and send him 
$250  his  cut on  something that  was  supposed  to  pull 
$500.  I  sent  the  e-gold  and  he  removes  me  from  his 
 
Figure 3: A model of the underground market regulatory 
system offered by carding forums. 
 
Figure 4: Typical management hierarchy on carding forums. contact list and ignores me LOL. I deserve to lose that 
cash,  I  was  foolish..  greed  got  the  best  of  me.  Be 
smarter than me and no one else make this mistake. Oh 
and other thing he does is jerk you around for hours. He 
jerked me around for hours and hours before telling me 
to send the E-gold. 
---- 
Ok,  Looks  like the  gods  have  spoken.  I  see hes  been 
banned.  I  dont  know  if  that  was  before  me  or  not. 
Anyway this post is a moot point now, I dont know if 
anyone else was taken though. 
This extract represents a typical complaint against dishonest 
traders  on  carding  forums.  As  shown,  the  administrators 
saw the complaint and the ripper was subsequently banned. 
However, it appears that only administrators are allowed to 
ban  members,  as  shown  in  the  following  extract  from  a 
moderator's response to a ripper complaint: 
He  is  dropped  from  the  vendor  list.  I  can't  ban  him 
outright since I'm not an admin, but that wouldn't do 
any good anyways. You guys with information on him 
need to apply some pressure - maybe PM Hacker123 
about this? 
This  highlights  the  power  delegation  and  coordination 
between those on the management hierarchy. Evidently, the 
inherent  hierarchical  management  structure  of  forums 
lowers  the  cost  of  implementing  an  effective  regulatory 
system  on forum activities. Furthermore, this hierarchical 
approach allows the management team to react quickly to 
problems.  As  shown  in  the  extract,  a  member lodged  an 
unverified  complaint  about  a  vendor  being  a  potential 
ripper. However, since verification takes time and banning 
requires  the  administrator’s  authorisation,  the  moderators 
immediately  took  action  to  mitigate  the  problem  by 
removing  the  vendor  from  the  vendor  list.  This 
demonstrates a high level of coordination in management 
[23, 29]. 
Lastly,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  rippers  are 
problematic even on carding forums. As shown in fig. 5, the 
arrival time of each new user registration is binned together 
by the number of months since the earliest registered user. 
The most striking pattern observable from the figure is that 
both forums experienced an identical sudden decay of new 
user  registrations  and  signups remained  extremely  scarce 
until their eventual demise. A manual examination of the 
confidential qualitative data from the two forums revealed 
that the administrators from both forums decided to disable 
membership in order to keep rippers from returning to the 
forums using different nicknames and email addresses. This 
highlights the scale of dishonest trading in the underground 
economy  and  the  importance  of  the  network  boundary 
offered by forums as it allows the segregation of dishonest 
behaviour from the market. 
Social networking 
As  already  mentioned,  social  networking  is  vital  to  the 
success of cybercriminals as it allows them to gain access to 
social capital [2] such as resources and opportunities which 
they  do  not  otherwise  possess.  In  order  to  verify  our 
hypothesis  that  carding  forums  facilitate  the  social 
networking among cybercriminals, we set out to examine 
whether  carding  forums  exhibit  two  well  known  social 
network properties: preferential attachment [1] and small-
world phenomenon [27]. 
In order to examine the two network properties, we focus 
on  the  private  message  (PM)  interactions  among 
cybercriminals  as  they  are  used  to  discuss  details  of 
 
CM    DM 
Figure 5: New user registration arrival over the entire lifecycle of the forums. The arrival dates are binned by the corresponding 
number of months since the earliest user registration. underground  trading.  Therefore,  private  messaging  is  the 
most  intimate  form  of  connection  among  the  forum 
members and thus the most accurate representation of the 
relationships among them. 
Since PM interactions are directed, we first model the data 
as a directed simple graph G = <V, A> where: 
1.  V = {v1, v2…vn} represents a set of vertices v1-n, each 
representing a forum member who has sent or received 
at least one PM. 
2.  A = {a1, a2…ay} is an ordered set of weighted directed 
edges (called arcs) where each arc represents a private 
message  sent  between  two  users  in  a  particular 
direction. The weight of an arc represents the frequency 
of PMs sent in a particular direction. 
The data is also modelled as an undirected graph UG where 
UG  = <V, E> with E = {e1, e2…ey} where E is an ordered 
set of weighted undirected edges formed by combining the 
weights  from  reciprocal  arcs.  This  is  necessary  for 
measuring the diameter (D) and clustering (C) of the PM 
graphs.The social graphs are summarised in table 2. 
Preferential attachment 
First  proposed  by  Barabási  and  Albert  [1],  the  degree 
distribution of many social networks have since been found 
to follow a power law distribution [1, 3]. One of the most 
common explanations for a power law degree distribution is 
the “the rich get richer” effect, better known as preferential 
attachment.  
As  shown  in  fig.  6,  neither  the  in-  nor  out-degree 
distributions of the PM graphs follow a power law decay. 
Rather,  they  are  best  approximated  by  a  lognormal 
distribution, a distribution cousin to power law [3, 13, 20]. 
This indicates that non-linear preferential attachment exists 
on the forums and that a fraction of the PM relations were 
established  randomly  [13,  20].  In  other  words,  although 
some forum members interact with others with a specific 
preference  (e.g.  reputation),  some  do  interact  without 
preference, perhaps for finding new business opportunities 
in the wild.  
Furthermore,  studies  [3,  20] argue  that lognormal  degree 
distribution is in fact  more common than first thought and 
they  are  often  misinterpreted  as  power  law  distributions. 
Therefore,  since  similar  behavioural  patterns  have  been 
observed  in  a  variety  of  social  networks  [3,  13,  20], we 
believe  our  findings  indicate  that  carding  forums  do 
facilitate social networking among cybercriminals. 
Small World 
The  small  world  phenomenon  also  has  important 
implications  for  the  underground  economy  because  as 
demonstrated  by  Kleinberg  [14],  a  small  world  greatly 
enhances the navigation within a social network. Shortcuts 
exist in a small world that enables any pair of vertices in the 
network to connect with one another through a relatively 
small  number  of  hops.  This  suggests  that  if  the  carding 
forums are capable of producing small worlds then they are 
capable of producing shortcuts in the underground economy 
and hence bringing cybercriminals closer together. In other 
words, if carding forums give rise to small worlds then our 
hypothesis would be proven correct. 
Watts  and  Strogatz  [27]  found  that  small  world  social 
networks commonly  exhibit two network properties: path 
lengths as short as that exhibited by a random lattice (such 
as an Erdȍs-Rényi graph)  but with a much higher degree of 
clustering than random structures. The network diameter D 
and clustering coefficient C of the two PM social networks 
and their Erdȍs-Rényi (ER) counterparts are shown in table 
3.  
Evidently,  both  social  networks  exhibit  a  clustering 
coefficient an order of magnitude greater than their random 
counterpart  whilst  their  path  lengths  remain  identically 
small relative to the network size. Therefore, our findings 
support our hypothesis that carding forums facilitate social 
networking among cybercriminals and thus are capable of 
giving  them  access  to  criminal  capitals  which  they 
otherwise would not possess.  
  CM  DM 
Number of vertices  2153  1716 
Number of arcs  11749  10154 
Number of edges  9465  7545 
Max out-degree  257  791 
Max in-degree  128  196 
Median out-degree  1  1 
Median in-degree  2  2 
Max degree  275  840 
Median degree  4  2 
Density  4*10
-3  5*10
-3 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the PM social networks. 
  CM  DM 
D  8  7 
DER  6  6 
C  9.0*10
-2  7.9*10
-2 
CER  4.5*10
-3  5.6*10
-3 
Table 3: The network diameter (D) and clustering co-
efficient (C) of the undirected PM graphs and their Erdȍs-
Rényi (ER) equivalent. Each ER graph was identical in 
size with the relevant PM graph and the edge creation 
probability was set to the density of the PM graph. Identity uncertainty mitigation 
By  offering  a  space  for  cybercriminals  to  engage  in 
reciprocal  and  mutually  beneficial  acts  such  as  the 
exchange of valuable information, these are the symbolic 
interactions  through  which  in-group  identity  and  group 
classification  can  be  developed  [24].  This  allows  the 
members to develop an understanding of the prototypical 
characteristics of the group and this implicitly gives them 
the ability to identify those who do not belong to the group. 
In other words, social networking facilitates the emergence 
of informal social control in the underground economy.  
An example of such interaction is shown in the following 
the forum extract below:  
Hacker123: People who's life is carding and other type 
of frauds (so no fucking students who do this part-time):  
Do you sometimes wish you just had a normal life, with 
this  I  mean  normal  job,  no  stress  about  ops,  making 
money, Law Enforcement  etc?  
or are you 100% happy with ur 'underground ops life' ?  
I would appreciate any input/thoughts 
------ 
Whatever123: I wish I had a normal life. Turn back the 
clock and all, but fuck it I am where I am. 
------ 
Yeah123:  Some  parts  of  it  I  love.  I'm  a  total  loaner 
outsider, some by choice and some by the fact I've never 
been the type of guys that gets the girls or anything. 
Doing what I'm doing kind of makes me feel like I'm 
doing something...something a little risky...then when i 
do  something,  I  still  sometimes  feel  guilty  about  the 
people I'm doing it to. I hate that part of it. I'm never 
going to have a normal life even if I try, so this life, as 
********  says,  "For  those  who  wish  to  play  in  the 
shadows" I love the shadows. I love doing things in the 
shadows. That's where I'm comfortable. 
The  last  post  by  Yeah123  is  of  particular  interest  as  it 
shows a rare and unique glimpse of the fragile side of a 
cybercriminal [28].  
In order to verify our hypothesis that participation in social 
networking facilitates trust building among cybercriminals, 
we examined the impact of thread and post degree have on 
PM degree. The results are shown in fig. 7-9. All regression 
models presented have a p-value ≤ 0.05 and the estimated 
parameters α and β represent the gradient and y-intercept of 
the linear regression line y = αx + β respectively. 
As shown in fig. 7, we found a strong positive correlation 
between  threads/posts  degree  and  PM  degree.  However, 
this is not enough to verify our hypothesis as this could just 
imply that users active in public discussions are also active 
in  private  messaging.  Therefore,  we  also  examined  the 
relationship between thread/post degree and the number of 
initial contacts received  via PM. As  shown in fig. 8, we 
found a strong positive correlation between thread degree 
and the number of initial contacts received via PM.  We 
also found a positive correlation between post and initial 
contacts received via PM, albeit a weaker correlation than 
that with threads. This indicates that participation in public 
discussions  do  increase  the  number  of  incoming  private 
contact from other forum members, in particular, through 
the creation of new threads. 
Lastly, we examined the relationship between the number 
of common threads shared among any two users and the 
number of PMs exchanged. As shown in fig. 9, we found a 
significant  positive  correlation  between  the  two  on  CM 
which  indicates  that  sharing  common  threads  leads  to 
higher levels of intimacy. However,  the same relationship 
appears  negligible  on  DM  although  the  low  R
2  score 
suggests a  poor fit due to noisy data.  
Nevertheless, we can conclude that the findings presented 
in  this  section  support  our  hypothesis  on  the  effects  of 
social networking and the development of trust. 
Quality uncertainty mitigation 
As Gambetta [7] notes: 
In  stable  markets,  in  which  agents  can  plausibly 
contemplate being in business for long periods of time 
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Figure 6: The Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of PM in- and out-degree. and in which information travels well, the best way to 
establish  one’s  reputation  for  trustworthiness  is 
simple: behave well and live up to one’s promises just 
as dealers do in many ordinary businesses. 
Like in the legitimate business world, reputation is key to a 
cybercriminal  who  strives  to  profit  from  their  criminal 
endeavour. However, it is useful to realise why reputation is 
needed in the first place. It is needed because many who 
want to collaborate have no prior knowledge or experience 
with the other. Accumulating a reputation by behaving well 
over time is difficult and time consuming as many simply 
refuse to deal with those without a reputation in the first 
place.  Therefore,  there  must  be  mechanisms  to  bootstrap 
initial  trust  among  cybercriminals  who  have  not 
collaborated  with  one  another  before  [17,  26].  One  such 
mechanism  offered  by  carding  forums  is  review.  A 
prospective  vendor  can  offer  to  have  their  goods  and/or 
services reviewed by an approved reviewer on the forum. A 
successful review will result in the vendor gaining the title: 
“Reviewed Vendor” – an approval of quality.  
In order to examine the effect of this seal of approval, we 
compared  the  network  statistics  of  the  reviewed  vendors 
against those who are on trial or unreviewed. As shown in 
table 4, there is a surprisingly few number of vendors on 
both forums. One explanation is that there are very few who 
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Figure 7: Linear relationship between thread/post degree and PM degree. 
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Figure 8: Linear relationship between thread/post degree and number of initial contacts received via PM. 
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Figure 9: Linear relationship between the number of common threads shared among users and the number of PMs 
exchanged between the pairs. possess a large enough supply of stolen credit card data to 
warrant  the  need  to  possess  a  vendor  title.  Nonetheless, 
there are some interesting behavioural differences between 
the two groups which are coherent on both forums.  
In general, reviewed vendors have a much higher median 
PM degree regardless of direction, almost doubling that of 
the unreviewed  vendors.  Similarly, reviewed vendors on 
both forums are far more active on public discussions with 
twice as many threads created and at least three times as 
many posts. Furthermore, the reviewed vendors receive and 
initiate  almost  twice  as  many  initial  contacts  via  PM. 
Altogether, the findings indicate that reviewed vendors are 
more active than those who are unreviewed. The fact that 
the reviewed vendors receive twice as many initial contacts 
demonstrates a higher level of trust shown towards them, 
thus  supporting  our  hypothesis  that  carding  forums 
mitigates quality uncertainty.  
It is also interesting to observe that the median in- and out- 
degree of the neighbouring vertices (with whom they have 
exchanged  at  least  one  PM)  are  generally  higher  for 
unreviewed vendors. One explanation is that they tend to 
communicate with more established members whom have 
accumulated higher PM degrees than themselves. Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that the more established members are 
more willing to take risks as they have more experience. On 
the  other  hand,  reviewed  vendors  have  a  lower 
neighbouring  degree  which  suggests  that  they  tend  to 
communicate  with  the  less  established  members.  This 
further supports our hypothesis that quality uncertainty is 
mitigated by the review process offered by carding forums. 
Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  uncertainty 
mitigation mechanism is enforced by the regulatory system 
shown in fig. 3 so that any vendor, regardless of whether 
they are reviewed or unreviewed, would be punished if they 
were found to have traded dishonestly.  
CONCLUSION 
Using  interaction  data  from  three  well  known  carding 
forums previously in operation over the Internet, this study 
has examined why forums are repeatedly chosen to operate 
online  stolen  data  markets.  Our  findings  indicate  that 
carding  forums  provide  four  fundamental  socio-economic 
mechanisms  which  greatly  facilitate  underground  trading 
over  the  Internet.  They  are:  (1)  formal  control  and 
coordination; (2) social networking; (3) identity uncertainty 
mitigation; (4) quality uncertainty mitigation. Furthermore, 
we have shown that the four mechanisms supplement one 
another, giving rise to a sophisticated underground market 
regulatory  system.  This  demonstrates  the  robustness  of 
carding  forums  and  explains  why  they  are  favoured  by 
cybercriminals. The findings from this study will allow law 
enforcement and security practitioners to better understand 
the  nature  and  estimate  the  scale  of  the  underground 
economy. The findings will also be useful for scanning the 
horizon  for  new  applications  which  offer  similar 
mechanisms and hence may be misused in similar ways to 
forums. 
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